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The empir ical work carr ied out in this study is founded on two basic
proposit ions. The f irst of these states that t ime means information to
man. As such, i t  should be viewed as an independent property of the
flow of information that we experience as reality and cannot be dis-
t inguished from propert ies or patterns of information such as size,
colour, loudness or spatial location.
The second proposit ion refers to the relat ionship between t ime and
memory processes. Over the last few years' experimental studies in the
fieid of memory research have become more focused on the ways in
which humans process temporal information. The main aim of the present
study is to further this approach and to begin to explore the variables
that govern our abi l i ty, or lack of i t ,  to dist inguish by memory the
ordering of events in t ime.
The part icular path fol lowed
iterat ing the three important




to  the  what ,  when,
most clearly by re-
Chapter  1 .  These
and how of temporal
The what issue involves asking what in a st imulus configuration actual ly
consti tutes the functional st imulus or temporal attr ibute which serves as
the input for temporal judgments. The second question, the when issue,
asks whether the temporal attr ibute, once identi f ied, is encoded upon
acquisit ion or, instead, constructed during retr ieval.  Thirdly'  the how
question asks whether temporal information is processed as an inevit-
able, automatic byproduct of information processing in general,  or
whether temporal information processing in i tself  requires specif ic
cognit ive effort.
Chapter 2 discusses the methodological issues involved in exploring the
encoding and retention of temporal information. The three types of
experimental tasks employed in the present study, namely order judg-
ments, lag estimates and posit ion judgments are described and the
d i f f i c r r l f  ies  wh ich  er ise  when we t rw to  comDare  such measures  are
response measures, ano one wnrcn wfu
subsequent chapters asks, rrcan a common
lies al l  three measures be identi f ied?rl
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information base that under-
The main topic of Chapter 3 relates to the automatic/control led dis-
t inct ion as i t  appl ies to temporal information. Although various theories
of attention are mentioned, the main emphases in this chapter are on
the posit ions adopted by Hasher and Zacks in 1979 and Tzeng and his
col leagues in 1979 and 1980. Hasher and Zacks consider memory pro-
cesses as a function of attention and quali tat ively dif ferent types of
processing. They present a l ist of cr i ter ia which are necessary for
dist inguishing between automatic and effortful processing and also
present evidence to substantiate their framework.
Notwithstanding the paucity of the evidence they produce, they reach
the f irm conclusion that temporal information is automatical ly encocied.
Conceptual confusions in their arguments are discussed and a dia-
metrical ly opposed viewpoint is put forward, namely rr.  .  .  temporal
information is not errcoded unless noticed and not noticed unless mean-
i n g f u l ! f '  ( M i c h o n  &  J a c k s o r r ,  1 9 8 4 ,  p .  3 0 5 ) .
The posit ion adopted by Tzeng and his col leagues also introduces
conceptual confusions about what should be cal led automatic processing.
Whereas they claim that their process model fol lows an automatici ty
view, we argue that i t  also seems to irrcorporate some non-automatic
features, namely rehearsal processes.
Since i t  makes an excel lent start ing point for our empir ical studies, the
set of cr i ter ia proposed by Hasher and Zacks is used to explore and
indeed rebuff the automatici ty viewpoint. These studies are described in
Chapters 4-7 and their aim is to provide empir ical evidence to answer
the what, when, and how questions posed earl ier. Given, however, that
these three questions are not independent, but are intr icately inter-
twined, we have selected to take as the start ing point of our research
the how question, and wil l  attempt to integrate the other related ques-
t ions into our experimental analysis. The f irst two experiments
described in Chapter 4 use a directed forgett ing paradigm in which
subjects are cued either to remember or to forget each i tem. The main
aim of the experiments is to explore the inf luence of st imulus character-
ist ics on temporal judgments. Results show that knowledge of temporal
information varies depending on whether the items are cued to-be-
remembered or to-be-forgotten but also, and more importantly, depend-
ing on whether st imulus material consisted of concrete or abstract
i tems. This latter pattern of results is dif f icult  to f i t  into the automatic
processing framework. The dif ferences found suggest that something
extra, possibly related to selective attention demands or processing
strategies, plays an important role. Results from the third experiment
also show that knowledge of temporal information varies depending on
wliether st imulus material is concrete or abstract. This experiment
expl ici t ly explored the cri terion of incidental versus intentional learn-
ing. Unlike the previous research quoted by Hasher and Zacks, the
results show that expl ici t  inst luct ions do affect the amount of temporal
information retained, and that this effect is part icularly evident when
abstract material is used.
In Chapter 5, a levels-of-processing procedure similar to that of Craik
and Lockhart (1972) is used to explore whether a rehearsal set con-
st i tutes a necessary condit ion for the successful performance of tem-
pora l  judgments ,  as  was suggested  by  Tzeng e t  a l .  (L979) .  Resu l ts
confirm this suggestion, since no temporal judgments exceed a random
guessing level fol lowing an orienting task which simpiy required a
shallow level of processing ( i .e. paying attention to the physical
structure of words). Results of an orienting task which demanded a
deeper leveI of processing ( i .e. paying attention to the semantic
structure of a word) are less straightforward, with signif icant dif-
ferences in performance occurring between various temporal judgment
tasks .
These results therefore chal lenge the view that al l  temporal coding
takes place automatical ly but do, on the other hand, support earl ier
f indings from our laboratory which show that while order judgments
ref lect some automatic encoding of intr insic order, such coding is not
suff icient to enable subjects to perform more complex temporal judgment
tasks adequately. These tasks require more del iberate processing.
Taken together, results from these three experiments begin to tackle
the what issue: they suggest that intr insic order is indeed a suitable
candidate to serve as the functional st imulus or temporal attr ibute for
temporal judgments. Furthermore, they give some answers to the when
issue: intr insic order is acquired at t ime of encoding.
In Chapter 6 the f i f th cri ter ion discussed by Hasher and Zacks, namely
developmental trends, is explored. I f ,  as these authors suggest, the
processing of temporal information is automatic, i t  should fol low that
performance on temporal tasks is relat ively insensit ive to developmental
variables. While experiments 5 and 6 studied the performance of young
children (5- and l1-year olds) on various tenrporal judgment tasks,
Experiment 7 compared the performance of two adult groups (24- and
60-year olds). The results from these three experiments appear at f i rst
sight to be somewhat contradictory: with some temporal judgment tasks,
no developmental effects are found but with others, signif icant develop-
mental dif ferences are observed. They are, however, in l ine with
evidence we have cited previously which claimed that dif ferent temporal
tasks require dif ferent qual i tat ive levels of processing. I f  words are
indeed attended, intr insic order is encoded without further processing
and this leads to above chance responding on order judgment tasks in
5- as well  as 1l-year olds, and in older as well  as younger adults.
Other temporal judgment tasks on the other hand, require addit ional
del iberate processing in order to produce accurate levels of perfor-
mance. Since i t  is precisely with this del iberate type of processing that
developmental effects occur, we predicted that developmental effects
would be found with posit ion as well  as with lag judgment tasks. Our
predict ions are met in these three experiments.
In  Chapter  7 ,  bo th  the  d isconten t  wh ich  arose as  a  resu l t  o f  a lways
relying on group data, and the cognit ive strategy approach which
developed as a result of this discontent, are discussed. A small  in-
depth study (Experiment 8) used protocol analyses to discover the
strategies which individuals use when carrying out various judgment
tasks. These protocols are then used to construct a fair ly extensive l ist
of the various strategies which could be adopted. In two of the experi-
ments described in this chapter, Experiments 9 and 10, a simpli f ied
coding system which involves grouping strategies into two main clus-
ters, simple or elaborative rehearsal, is adopted. During the study and
test phase of the experiment subjects in each condit ion are treated as a
uniform group. Prior to stat ist ical analyses, however, they are assigned
to one of the two strategy groups. Although dramatic changes depend-
ing on either l ist structure or task demands had been expected, these
expectations are not fulf i l led. Instead, subjects tended to continue with
their original choice of strategy.
An important research question which was explored in these experiments
asks whether there is a relat ionship between strategy use and per-
formance. Results from al l  three experiments reveal posit ive effects,
with subjects who use elaborative strategies performing better. Per-
formance on temporal tasks is therefore closeiy related to the strategies
subjects use. In addit ion, performance also reveals a considerable
reffect of practicer. These cri teria are, however, among those cited by
Hasher and Zacks as being indicative of the del iberate information
process ing  mode l
Chapter B summarizes our posit ion and gives answers to the three
important questions posed in Chapter l .  We adopt the stance that t ime
is an inherent propefiy of nature just i fying in an objective way the
dist inct ion between earl ier and later. Our task as a psychologist is
therefore described as one of establ ishing how thi.s order is codeci and
represented. The experimental results support our bel ief that intr insic
order consti tutes the functional st imulus which serves as the input for
temporal judgments. Furthermore, this order is acquired at t ime of
encoding. The third issue relat ing to the how question is not so
straightforward. Using their own crj . ter ia, we have col lected a con-
siderable amount of data which direct ly chal lenges l . lasher and Zacks
().979) automatici ty stance.
We have also found experimental results which suggest that encoding
intr insic order relat ionships is a necessary but not suff icient condit iorr
to produce adequate temporal retention in a1l tasks. Instead, we sug-
gest that a hierarchy exists such that dif ferent temporal judgment tasks
demand dif ferent levels of processing: simply being avai lable in working
memory for further processing is a necessary condit ion to lay down
old-new relat ionships, and these in turn are in the main suff icient to
produce above-chance levels of performance on order judgments. In
contrast, both posit ion and lag judgments require further del iberate
processing of these old-new relat ionships in order to produce high
levels of performance.
The posit ion adopted assumes that the temporal information which is
coded relates to sequential information and that other temporal in-
formation, such as interval information, is derived from this coded
information. Unless attended to and processed further, however, such
information loses val idity. while a loss of val idi ty affects posit ion and
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lag judgments, order judgments can st i l l  be made fair ly adequately.
The f inal issue discussed reiates to the representation of order in-
formation. The ideas expressed in this study f i t  wel l  within the re-
presenta t iona l  sys tem descr ibed by  Anderson ( i983) .  He proposes  a
separate representational code for temporal information and suggests
that rrtemporal str ingsrr record the sequential structure of events. Our
data also lend some credibi l i ty to a further (prel iminary) suggestion
raised by Anderson, namely that posit ional and interval ir i formation may
and can be del iberately encoded as extra features.
